dav i d d r a n ov e c h ri stoph e r o dy A B S T R A C T Many researchers assess the impact of provider market structure and market power on outcomes such as price. These studies use a variety of measures of structure and power, ranging from ad hoc measures often based on census boundaries to structural measures derived from economic models of provider-payer bargaining. We explain the shortcomings of ad hoc measures, and, through a series of "horse races" show that one leading structural measure, the "willingness to pay," is a consistently better predictor of prices.
I. Introduction
Ongoing health-care provider consolidation has rekindled interest in research on provider market power. Many studies document the evolving structure of hospital and physician markets. Others document how market structure and market power affect key measures of performance such as price. Most of these studies rely on ad hoc approaches to defining markets and measuring power, including census boundaries, hospital referral regions, "fixed radii" (i.e., a hospital competes with all other hospitals within a given distance), and "variable radii" (i.e., a hospital competes with other hospitals within a distance that is allowed to vary from hospital to hospital, such as a radius large enough to include X percent of a hospital's patients). Unfortunately, these approaches can generate misleading conclusions if they stray too far from the underlying economics that drive market performance. In this paper, we describe willingness to pay (WTP), a structural approach to measuring provider market power that has gained popularity in economic studies of hospital competition as well as in litigated antitrust cases. We demonstrate the practical value of WTP by performing regressions that pit it against various ad hoc measures of market power as alternative predictors of provider revenues and prices.
II. Measurement Problems in Ad Hoc Specifications
Nearly all methods for measuring market power begin with the measurement of market shares. One cannot measure shares without first defining markets. Two different approaches to market definition have come to dominate health services research. Both approaches are ad hoc, that is, they are not based on a formal model of price determination. In the first approach, researchers use contiguous areas in which a set of providers are located, such as metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), which include one or more counties surrounding a central city, or hospital referral regions (HRRs), which represent regional health-care markets for tertiary services. In addition to measuring each provider's share in each market, researchers often compute a measure of overall market structure, typically the Herfindahl index for each "market area." 1 In the second approach, researchers assign to each hospital its own "market area" based on where it draws patients, and compute measures of market structure specific to each hospital.
A. A D H O C M A R K E T D E F I N I T I O N S B A S E D O N C E N S U S O R O T H E R B O U N D A R I E S
Many studies rely on ad hoc geographic boundaries to define markets. For example, Baker, Bundorf, and Kessler (2014) use counties, Gaynor (2011) uses MSAs, while Carey, Burgess, and Young (2011) and Cutler and Scott Morton (2013) use HRRs.
2 Dranove and Shanley (1990) , Capps et al. (2002) , and Gaynor, Kleiner, and Vogt (2013) point out potential biases inherent in such ad hoc boundaries, as the following example illustrates.
Suppose we naively define hospital markets to consist of the nine major census divisions (e.g., New England, Mid-Atlantic); then all hospitals would have very low market shares and appear to have little to no market power. One might instead define markets to be zip codes. Most hospitals would appear to be monopolies, which would again be misleading. The nine census divisions are obviously too large and zip codes are obviously too small to be properly defined markets. But this begs the question-is there any ad hoc rule that will generate economically sound geographic markets? As mentioned earlier, many analysts use MSAs or HRRs. This approach has huge implications for studies of market power. Gaynor, Kleiner, and Vogt (2013) show that the median US "market" defined using MSAs and HRRs contains 18 and 16 hospitals respectively, suggesting that the vast majority of hospitals are in competitive markets. If we accept MSAs and HRRs as reasonable market definitions, debates about market power would be all but over.
Economic research as well as evidence presented in antitrust cases suggests that these boundaries may be too large.
3 For example, in FTC v. Evanston Northwestern, Evanston NW Healthcare Corp., FTC Docket No. 9315 (August 6, 2007 ) (Commission opinion), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) successfully argued that insurers needed broad geographic coverage in order to successfully market their managed care networks, so that the relevant market for the case was a portion of the suburban area north of Chicago, which is 1 The Herfindahl equals the sum of the squared market shares of all market participants. We provide the formula for the Herfindahl in Section IV. 2 HRRs are derived from information about where patients travel for hospital care but are not derived from any theory of competition. Thus, there is no theoretical mapping from "market" structure within HRRs to prices. 3 Capps and Dranove (2004) and Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003) . much smaller than an HRR or an MSA.
4 In FTC v. St. Luke's Health System, Ltd., 2014 WL 272339 (D. Idaho January 24, 2014 , the FTC again argued that insurers require broad geographic coverage, this time for primary care services, and successfully argued that the relevant market for primary care physician services was a suburb of Boise, Idaho. Market definition in both cases was fact intensive; it would be difficult for researchers to replicate this approach to define markets served by hundreds or thousands of providers. Unfortunately, there is no obvious ad hoc approach that would capture the geographic coverage needs of managed care purchasers. Zip codes are likely to be too small and counties are likely to be too large (although whether they are too small or too large would depend on the specific facts, such as whether the case involves highly specialized services or primary care). And even if analysts agree to use ad hoc census boundaries, additional problems emerge. It might make sense to use larger boundaries for tertiary care hospitals or for cardiac surgery, and smaller boundaries for maternity or primary care. Unfortunately, ad hoc approaches cannot tell us how exactly to adjust the boundaries.
Suppose that analysts are able to find an appropriate ad hoc approach to defining markets. The next step is to compute market shares and use them to explain within-market variation in pricing (or some other performance metric). The researcher is now faced with a new problem. Two hospitals with the same shares may be highly differentiated, so that they are not expected to negotiate the same prices. For example, a hospital offering specialized services that are not available at nearby hospitals may command higher prices than a neighbor that offers a broader set of widely available services. In order to capture this potential pricing power, the researcher could control for service offerings and other points of differentiation. This would help the researcher predict pricing by individual providers, but would be of limited value for predicting the impact of consolidation on prices and other outcomes, as it is difficult to know how to use the regression to predict price changes without making further assumptions.
Rather than dividing the map into contiguous nonoverlapping markets, some analysts have instead taken a firm-centric approach that permits overlapping markets. For example, hospitals often identify catchment areas, usually defined to be the area from which they draw 75-90 percent of their patients. Each hospital identifies its competitors and market share within its unique catchment area. We may think of the catchment area as a measure of inflows; that is, it measures where hospitals draw their patients from. The well-known Elzinga-Hogarty method for market definition considers both inflows and outflows, where the latter measures where patients residing in the catchment area travel for care. According to this method, a market is well-defined if both inflows and outflows are below a threshold such as 10 percent or 25 percent. This approach tends to generate broad geographic markets and has been frequently used by economists testifying on behalf of providers in merger cases. 5 The Elzinga-Hogarty method has been sharply criticized on theoretical, empirical, and practical grounds. 6 Theoretical models show that low patient flows are consistent with a range of market outcomes, from monopoly pricing to perfect competition. Empirically, high flows are supposed to indicate a lack of market power, yet researchers have found that mergers in markets with high flows often lead to large price increases. And as a practical matter, the ultimate market boundaries that result from flow-based analyses can depend critically on the narrow market chosen for initial consideration.
Economists have used admissions data to develop more sophisticated provider-centric approaches. Zwanziger, Melnick, and Mann (1990; henceforth Zwanziger et al.) and Kessler and McClellan (2000;  henceforth KM) compute a distinct Herfindahl for each hospital, following the steps outlined in Section IV. KM show how to use plausibly exogenous hospital and patient locations to eliminate the potential for omitted variable bias, and Cooper et al. (2011) use a similar measure in their study of health-care quality in England.
By accounting for actual travel patterns and allowing each hospital to face different competitive conditions, the KM approach represents an improvement over the use of census boundaries. Even so, it is still ad hoc in the sense that the connection between the KM measure and actual market power is based solely on economic intuition, rather than a formal theoretical model that directly links the structure measure to a market outcome. Not only must we accept the intuition at face value, we must accept that the specific algorithm for computing the KM measure is the best way to implement the intuition. (These are, of course, natural limitations of ad hoc approaches, and do not necessarily imply that the KM measure is a bad way to measure market structure.) In addition, while KM offer a way to measure market structure, they do not discuss how to measure market power. Below, we propose a simple modification that can be used to measure power.
III. A New Paradigm
About 15 years ago, Town and Vistnes (2001; henceforth TV) , Gaynor and Vogt (2003; henceforth GV), and Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003; henceforth CDS) introduced structural approaches to measuring market power. These approaches have much in common. They start by directly modeling each provider's pricing problem, taking into account model "primitives" that contain detailed information about all patients and all providers. The models generate "structural equations" relating performance to functions of the model primitives. These functions show the analyst how to take the information in hundreds of variables or more and turn it into a far more manageable specification. For example, CDS derive a single statistic for predicting hospital pricing that they call willingness to pay (WTP).
All three studies make assumptions about how market participants interact, and derive the implied mathematical relationship between model primitives and performance. The TV and CDS models specifically model the bargaining that takes place between insurers and hospitals and generate similar formulae for computing each hospital's bargaining power. Although GV take a different modeling approach, their key formula resembles the others. As with ad hoc approaches, the formulae incorporate market shares, except here the shares are based on "micromarkets," which are defined by small geographies (e.g., zip codes), demographics (e.g., race), and medical conditions (e.g., congestive heart failure). The formulae show the analyst how to add up micromarket shares to compute each hospital's overall bargaining power, in a specific manner implied by the theory. And while none of the approaches assume a specific market definition, they can be used to define markets by following some general guidelines established by the Department of Justice and FTC. 7 Of the three models, CDS has been most widely adopted and we will use it throughout the rest of this paper. CDS' measure of provider pricing power, WTP, represents the amount that a managed care payer is willing to pay to include a provider in its network. WTP is derived from a detailed model of patient choice of provider whose primitives may include the locations of all providers and patients, service offerings and other provider characteristics, and detailed patient characteristics. A simple bargaining model predicts that providers with higher WTP will receive higher revenues (implicitly, through higher prices) from payers, and CDS show that WTP is highly correlated with hospital prices. Subsequent studies by Fournier and Gai (2007) , Ho (2009) , and Gowrisankaran, Nevo, and Town (2015) The WTP approach seems to offer several advantages over ad hoc approaches. It is derived from an economic model designed to capture some of the realities of hospital/insurer bargaining and is not subject to the challenges of market definition that afflict ad hoc approaches. Even so, the proof of the superiority of WTP is, as they say, in the pudding. In the rest of this paper we conduct a simple "horse race" between WTP and market shares, and between WTP and hospital-specific measures of market concentration.
IV. Data and Methods
We proceed by discussing our data and methodology in four steps. First, we describe the methodology we use to estimate the key "market power" independent variables. Second, we provide some simple examples to illustrate the differences between the various measures. Third, we discuss how we construct private patient costs and revenues. Finally, we explain the additional sampling restrictions that we impose when running our "horse race."
All of our measures of market power rely on inpatient hospital utilization data. We use the well-known data from the California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) to compute inpatient revenues and prices for privately insured patients for all hospitals in 1990 and 1991. With minor modifications, we restrict attention to the state's metropolitan areas.
8 To facilitate estimation of KM, we subdivide the state into four large regions: (1) Greater Los Angeles, (2) Greater San Francisco and the Interstate 5 corridor from Stockton to Bakersfield and the accompanying coast (henceforth "Central CA") / Greater Sacramento, (3) San Diego, and (4) San Luis Obispo and Santa Barbara Counties (henceforth "Central Coast"). 9 For purposes of computing other measures of market share and structure, we subdivide the state into MSAs and HRRs. We further restrict our sample to patients who visited short-term acute facilities and exclude newborns so as to avoid double counting of choices. To facilitate estimation of the demand model for KM, we impose additional minor restrictions on the available choice set of hospitals.
10
Taken together, these restrictions eliminate 2.7 percent of all patients in our sample, leaving us with 347 hospitals and over 2.75 million patients. We apply these restrictions to all measures of market power, and describe below a number of additional minor restrictions necessary to facilitate "apples-to-apples" comparisons.
All of the approaches that we consider begin by measuring market shares. We now describe how shares are used to compute the alternative measures of market power and market structure.
A. A D H O C M A R K E T D E F I N I T I O N S B A S E D O N C E N S U S O R O T H E R B O U N D A R I E S
We consider three variations on this model, relying upon different market definitions:
(1) MSA; (2) HRR; and (3) zip codes making up a 75 percent catchment area. The 75 percent catchment area is computed as follows:
(1) Select a hospital or hospital system. (2) Sort zip codes by the hospital/system's share within the zip code.
(3) Add zip codes to the hospital/system's market until 75 percent of the hospital/ system's patients are in the market.
Once the markets are defined, researchers may compute shares, based on revenues, patients, or some other measure of volume. In our empirical implementation, shares are always calculated based upon patient counts or predicted patient counts. Shares can then be plugged into the following formula to compute the Herfindahl:
where Herf m is the Herfindahl index for market m and s mh is the share of each provider h in market m. We calculate these measures using the choices of privately insured patients (i.e., indemnity 11 and HMO/PPO patients). Because we obtain very similar findings for each of the three alternative market definitions, we will present only the HRR results. Additional results are shown in the Online Appendix (http://www.mitpressjournals.org /doi/suppl/10.1162/AJHE a 00039).
B. T H E Z W A N Z I G E R E T A L . A P P R O A C H
The Zwanziger et al. approach involves computing a Herfindahl index that is specific to each hospital. The researcher begins by computing each hospital's share of every specific "micromarket" served by the hospital, where a micromarket consists of a disease category and a zip code. For example, childbirth patients residing in zip code 90001 would represent one micromarket. The researcher then computes the Herfindahl index for every micromarket. The hospital-specific Herfindahl for a given hospital is the weighted average of the Herfindahls in each micromarket it serves, where the weights correspond to the volume of business the hospital does in each micromarket. To facilitate comparisons with other methods, we also define a hospital's share as the weighted average of its shares in each micromarket. Zwanziger et al. and Kessler and McClellan essentially follow the same steps:
(1) Identify the micromarkets (i.e., location/disease category pairs) served by a given hospital. In practice, researchers usually use zip codes and major disease categories (MDCs). 11 By indemnity, we mean insurance that reimburses a patient for care with no restrictions on provider choice; that is, pre-managed care era traditional fee-for-service insurance. 12 All hospitalizations can be assigned to one of 25 MDC codes, so MDC codes are a relatively broad category.
We also compute a weighted average market share for each hospital:
An important difference between the two approaches is that Zwanziger et al. uses actual shares whereas Kessler and McClellan use predicted shares based on a demand model.
C. W I L L I N G N E S S T O P A Y
For calculating WTP, we define a "micromarket" in the same way as before: as a zip code/major disease category pair. However, the formula for computing WTP is derived from a theoretical model of demand that is specifically developed to capture the value that a hospital brings to a managed care network. This value determines the price that a hospital is able to receive through negotiations with managed care payers and differs considerably from the formula used to compute hospital-specific Herfindahls. The WTP for hospital h is defined as the following:
where N is the number of patients andŝ mh is the predicted share of hospital h in micromarket m. The WTP formula states that a hospital's bargaining power is related to its weighted predicted market shares in each and every micromarket that it serves, where the weights are the sizes of the micromarkets. (In the formula, WTP is exactly related to the sum of the logs of its rivals' predicted shares.) It follows that hospitals will have higher WTP if they dominate many large micromarkets. It is important to note that WTP is not an ad hoc formula; instead, it is derived from a logit demand model. We explain below how we estimate the parameters of the demand model, which enable us to compute N andŝ .
To make the comparison with KM as close as possible, we createŝ mh using actual choice data for Medicare patients under 75 and patients with indemnity insurance (because these patients face unrestricted choices among hospitals). We then use a count of indemnity and HMO/PPO patients (i.e., the set of privately insured patients) in order to calculate N m .
D. S U M M A R Y O F K E Y D I F F E R E N C E S A M O N G M E A S U R E S
We briefly highlight a few of the main differences among the three measures of competition and market power that are derived from demand modeling: the KM measures, the Zwanziger et al. measures, and WTP. The first difference among the measures is that both WTP and Zwanziger et al. measure shares based upon actual patient choices (or use potentially endogenous hospital characteristics), whereas the KM approach relies on relatively exogenous determinants of patient demand. Which approach is appropriate depends upon the question at hand. We make this point by describing a stylized model. Consider two markets. In the first, there are two hospitals that are very close geographic competitors, but choose to specialize in treating very different patients. In the second, there are two hospitals that are distant geographic competitors, but each has a wide range of service offerings. If the first two hospitals had differentiated in service offerings enough so as to not be "close competitors," it is possible that they each face less actual competition than the two hospitals that are farther from each other. WTP and Zwanziger et al. use the variation arising from the endogenous decision of the two geographically proximate hospitals to differentiate in terms of service offerings. KM does not. In the original KM paper, this is with good reason, as the authors are studying how relatively exogenous determinants of competition affect quality. Therefore, they do not use variation arising from the fact that high-quality hospitals face less competition ex post because they are better than their would-be competitors.
The second key difference is in how microshares are aggregated. KM and Zwanziger et al. rely upon an ad hoc formula, for turning a micromarket's share into micromarket Herfindahl-Hirschman indexes (HHIs). There is then a second ad hoc decision for deciding how to aggregate across micromarkets. WTP relies upon a different formula derived from a theoretical model of demand and bargaining in order to turn micromarket shares into a measure of market power.
E. T H E D E M A N D M O D E L
Both KM and WTP rely on predictions from a hospital demand model. KM focuses on acute myocardial infarction patients. We modify their method by running separate demand models for patients in all MDCs. 13 We assume that patient choice of hospital depends on driving distances in minutes (with the coefficient allowed to vary for 0-10, 11-20, and more than 20 minutes of driving time) and interactions between patient characteristics and both time and whether a hospital is a teaching hospital. 14 There are noteworthy differences between the demand models used in WTP analysis and KM, reflecting their different purposes. KM measures exogenous differences in the competitive environment facing each hospital, whereas WTP directly measures market power, using relatively exogenous hospital characteristics that may affect power. More recent papers (for example, Gowrisankaran, Nevo, and Town 2015) have included hospital fixed effects.
The KM measures of market share and hospital-specific HHI are computed identically to Zwanziger et al. except that for KM we use predicted rather than actual shares. 13 We aggregate some of the smallest MDCs together: ungroupable (0), eye (2), burns (22), factors including health status (23), multiple traumas (24), and HIV (25). We alter other MDCs so as to create one for all cardiac and circulatory conditions and one for all cancers. We created another artificial MDC code for all patients admitted through the ER. Finally, we split childbirths into two groups, depending upon whether the mother had a C-section (fully recognizing the potential endogeneity of C-sections). 14 Patient characteristics are the following: elderly (60 + years old), ln(median income) calculated based on patient's zip code and race, DRG weight, in-hospital mortality rate (based on DRG and Charlson score comorbidities), and race.
When implementing both KM and WTP, we estimate the demand model using Medicare patients under 75 and patients with indemnity insurance (because these patients face unrestricted choices among hospitals). These demand estimates are then applied to indemnity and HMO/PPO patients (i.e., the set of privately insured patients) in order to compute predicted shares.
F. F U R T H E R C O N S I D E R A T I O N S
We use revenue and cost data from the 1991 fiscal year, which is usually July 1990 through June 1991. We define the variable Revenues as our measure of private inpatient revenues. We calculate it as private inpatient charges minus estimated private inpatient deductions from revenues, where we follow OSHPD's example and attribute deductions from revenue to inpatient and outpatient activities proportionally to revenue. We also adjust revenues to eliminate physician charges that some (but not all) hospitals report as a part of charges. We define Costs as our measure of private inpatient costs. The OSHPD data aggregates costs over all payer types, as well as over inpatient and outpatient services. We estimate private inpatient costs by multiplying total costs for each cost center by the proportion of private patient charges to total patient charges and then summing over cost centers.
Before running our horse race, we make a number of additional sampling restrictions. We eliminate 64 government-owned hospitals, the six quasi-governmental hospitals in the University of California system, and the remaining academic medical centers and their affiliates (Stanford, Loma Linda, and the University of Southern California) and CedarsSinai Hospital.
15 Finally, we drop two observations with data errors. The unit of observation is the chain/market. 16 Our final sample size is 182 chain/market observations, which are based on data from 259 hospitals.
We previously mentioned how researchers may augment their regressions by adding additional variables that measure service offerings and location. To determine whether inclusion of control variables affects our results, in some specifications we include the following variables: for-profit status, teaching status, nervous system hospital, respiratory hospital, cardiology hospital, obstetric delivery hospital, MRI hospital, psychiatric hospital, transplant hospital, and logged distance to nearest competitor. 17 15 In prior research, WTP underestimates pricing by elite academic medical centers. It remains unclear why this is the case. We could follow nonstructural approaches by including an acute myocardial infarction dummy, but it would be difficult to use the model to predict merger effects. Cedars Sinai Hospital is the well-known "hospital to the stars. " We doubt whether any systematic approach could predict its very high prices. 16 Chain ownership data is based on historical data from our time period. It is located at http://www.usc .edu/schools/price/research/healthresearch/HospitalData.html. Accessed February 17, 2015. It is based on self-reported ownership information from financial reports, but has been subject to additional, extensive data cleaning. Details are available on the website. 17 When calculating WTP, we use shares based on actual visits within each micromarket, rather than shares based on a choice model. We have confirmed that all results are effectively identical if we instead use predicted shares to calculate WTP, where the predicted shares are from choice models identical to the choice models used to predict KM HHI, except that they also include hospital × MDC fixed effects. Table 1 provides summary statistics for our key measures. One thing to note is that the coefficient of variation (standard deviation/mean) is smaller for WTP than for the ad hoc measures. Even so, all measures show sufficient variation to be potentially useful predictors of revenue and price.
V. Regression Results

A. S U M M A R Y S T A T I S T I C S
18 Table 2 presents the correlations among the various measures. All of the measures are positively correlated. Many of the ad hoc measures show correlations with each other of 0.5 or higher, but are much less correlated with WTP. Thus, WTP measures something different than the ad hoc measures.
B. H O R S E R A C E S
There are many potential comparisons between WTP and other metrics. To facilitate presentation, we focus on horse races between WTP and HRR-based share and concentration measures, and between WTP and the KM share and concentration measures. Results from the full slate of horse races, which echo those for HRRs and KM, are in Online Appendix Tables 1 through 4. The numbering of these appendix tables mirrors the numbering of the tables in the text. We will mention these alternative results when appropriate. Table 3 presents the results of the first set of horse races. The dependent variable in each regression is private revenues. 19 We examine revenues because, as CDS point out, hospitals and insurers effectively bargain over the total payments to the hospital; prices are simply a means to that end. We do examine prices in later regressions. We employ ad hoc measures of market concentration in panel A and ad hoc measures of market share in panel B. We include cost as a predictor in all regressions; our conclusions do not change if we exclude cost. The R 2 is very high in all specifications; this is because cost is very predictive of revenue. The WTP regression in column 1 is identical in both panels. On its own, WTP has the right sign and is a highly significant predictor of revenues. When used individually (columns 2 and 3), the ad hoc measures also have the right sign, but are marginally significant at best. Some of the other ad hoc measures fare better. For example, the Zwanziger et al. measures of HHI and share both have the right sign and are significant at p < 0.10 and p < 0.05, respectively. The specification with WTP has the highest R 2 and explains a substantial fraction of the variance not already explained by cost.
T A B L E 2 . Correlation among measures of market power
When WTP and an ad hoc measure are used jointly (columns 4 and 5), the coefficient and significance level on WTP are essentially unchanged. The coefficients on the ad hoc measures are much smaller and sometimes have the wrong sign. None are remotely significant. The same is true for the other ad hoc measures. Table 4 is similar to Table 3 except the dependent variable is logged price. Both cost and WTP are expressed per patient. Here, the superiority of WTP is even more pronounced. WTP is significant at p < 0.01 in all specifications. The ad hoc measures are not significant, even when used in isolation. Indeed, a naive analyst might interpret the results from the ad hoc measures as evidence that hospitals do not possess and/or exercise market power. 
T A B L E 3 . Dep var = private revenues ($ 000s)
VI. Discussion
It is self-evident that studies of market power benefit from using appropriate metrics. We have demonstrated that when it comes to predicting hospital revenues and prices, a measure of market power derived from an economic theory of hospital/physician bargaining, willingness to pay (WTP), outperforms other more traditional measures such as market share and the Herfindahl index. Some analysts may balk at using the WTP because it is (1) somewhat nonintuitive, (2) computationally challenging, and (3) taxes computer resources. In fact, WTP (and the related formulae derived by TV and GV) is highly intuitive. The WTP approach states that a hospital obtains market power by having large market shares in many micromarkets. In this way, WTP is similar to other approaches that also rely on market shares. The power from WTP comes from using economic theory to show how to add up those shares to obtain the hospital's overall power. WTP can be computed from widely available administrative claims data and is increasingly being used in economic studies of hospital competition and in economic expert reports in antitrust cases.
In the original exposition of WTP, Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003) present a highly stylized bargaining model in which WTP is translated into prices. This bargaining model is quite simplistic, and more recent work by Ho (2009) and Gowrisankaran, Nevo, and Town (2015) , among others, start with WTP but make important improvements. Among other things, they consider competition among insurers (Ho) and allow for patients to choose in-network providers based on price (Gowrisankaran, Nevo, and Town) . Moving forward, it seems likely that WTP will continue to be the preferred measure of bargaining power, and future studies should move away from ad hoc measures such as those we have described herein.
